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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC., 
a Maryland non-profit 
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and, 
RICHARD ANDREWS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
-v-
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State 
Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE 
JAY B. TAGGART 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Defendant/Appellee Jay B. Taggart through his counsel 
R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney General, and John S. McAllister, 
Assistant Attorney General, submits the following brief in 
support of his position on appeal. 
No. 910400647 
Priority No. 16 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case should have been brought under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act: Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 (1992) for the 
District Court and Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-7 (1992) on appeal. 
However, the correct statute does not cure a cause of action 
otherwise defective because it is moot, without standing or 
merely advisory in nature. See also Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Plaintiff/Appellants' cause of action is 
moot. 
2. Whether Plaintiffs/Appellants have standing to 
bring this action. 
3. Whether Plaintiffs/Appellants are entitled to the 
relief requested: 
a. may the Utah Supreme Court review the merits 
of this case despite the absence of any hearing, 
factual basis, findings or decision on the merits in 
the court below; 
b. if the merits are considered, whether the Utah 
Constitution was violated by financially assisting a 
school district's Petition for Certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
-2-
The Standard for Review of the lower court decision on 
the basis of mootness or lack of standing which involve no 
factual dispute is review of the legal issues; where the lower 
court must determine the facts the appropriate standard is 
whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P-2d 553, 556 (Utah 1984). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust 
or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or 
hold office, except as provided in this 
Constitution. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellants Society of Separationists, Inc., 
Chris Allen and Richard Andrews (herein referred to as Society or 
Appellant Society) complained against Jay Taggart, Utah State 
-3-
Superintendent of Public Instruction (herein referred to as 
Defendant Taggart) claiming a violation of the Utah Constitution 
article I, section 4. The Society asked the district court for a 
temporary retraining order to enjoin Defendant Taggart from 
preparing or filing an amicus curiae brief on the merits in the 
case of Lee v. Weisman, U.S. , 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 
24, 1992), U. S. Supreme Court No. 90-1014 and for a declaratory 
judgment that Defendant Taggart's expenditure to the Providence 
Rhode Island school district in assistance of its petitions for 
"Writ of Certiorari violated the Utah Constitution. 
Defendant Taggart moved the district court to dismiss 
the action and the Society filed no response. The lower court 
dismissed the action. The Society now appeals asking the Utah 
Supreme Court to hear the matter for the first time and enter an 
original decision on the merits despite the fact that the lower 
court never heard or considered the merits of Appellant Society's 
allegation. 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Defendant Taggart disagrees with Appellant Society's 
statement of the proceedings and disposition below and sets forth 
his own statement. 
The Society's complaint is dated May 1, 1991, and was 
served on Defendant Taggart on May 30, 1991. (R. at 11.) The 
complaint is attached as an exhibit to the Society's Brief on 
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Appeal Mil I ili. Iif-r*' i The comrdairit asked fur a temporary 
restraining ordei and declaratory judqiutu, bf-lpndant. Taggurt 
filed a Motion to Dismiss on IHDM \ht jyyi. (K ut 4 I i 
Pursuant • i< 1 | • if i | ' "ac of Judicial Administratic . the 
Society had J l"1 days tu respond t the f >i . • ' IMSTILIFS before 
Defendants Notice to Submit ft r Decision, N .1 t unely response i 
Defendant TcuMirt h Mu! nun l.u [uRniis: wap ever filed,1 
In 1 he District Court ' s mi nut c i i i i I d i *:"n i SFB I on 
, ,' I ' , P'M , H IF nrited thdt there be.ing nothing submitted t^ 
HaiJiti 1 t i L'eJe1, hi.1 I'rj q i ri« ' • Motion »• Dismiss was granted. 
Ret- minute entry dated July 1 VJB2, att.j hmi .is Af. pen r, ,x A." 
in ( i i in 
Tht Scoie4 ; hn< n r i i. id . [ (. \ east eS 0 days after the 
Kay 1st cornt-idint t c dsl- lor d hearing JP itt |»oti.to JI li i 
temporary i PS I r rj , r, , n i order, bin did nothing t have a hearing or 
to otherwise prosecut€j iti. tisf i M II \m i t ,c 1\K timely 
response was* evei made to Defendant Tagyart's Moticn '". i liom-i:. . 
AppMlani Si" IHIS kid rveiij opportunity to be heard on the merits 
under the rules ol piouedun. mil neijlt" I i I in In so 11 i -i 
c u r i O U S that the Society would ask foi immediate reji^J i ,i i ,• 
2No response to Defendant Taggart's Motion ;c ;..?:!.h-i- ^..pears 
..he official court records, and it is likeJy that none was ever 
5i On J-ne 26, 1991, the Society file a Motion to Consolidate 
.it against Defendant Taggart with a similar but separate suit 
-t Attcmey General Paul Van Dam. Upon dismissal of Defendant 
± • ' r •*- w~tion foi Consolidation Ke ra^- r-rt 
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complaint and then ignore the obvious and necessary steps to 
obtain a hearing. 
Appellant Society now attempts to appeal this matter to 
the Supreme Court asking for an original hearing on the merits 
after failing in its duty to see that any factual record, hearing 
or decision on the merits was created in the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Defendant Taggart disagrees with the Society's 
statement of facts, and is constrained to set forth his own 
statement as follows: 
In July, 1990, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
decided the case of Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) 
affirming a lower federal court decision that prayer at public 
school graduation ceremonies was unconstitutional. At that time 
there were five lower court cases pending in Utah concerning 
prayer (two for, three against) as well as several other cases in 
other states. 
Officials in the Utah education system were then caught 
in a dilemma: a decision to have prayer or not have prayer 
resulted in litigation. Without any reasonable means to limit 
expenditure of time and money to defend these actions, these 
public officials were at the mercy of anyone who claimed a 
violation by either allowing or preventing prayer. Yet it was 
impossible to decide both ways. 
-6-
Concerned about the continuing turmoil and expense 
at tend a n I uj.'m I In ongoinq 1 i 1 i qnt lor. dup 'o tin- adamant 
positions taken cm juti sides v* i i II.HII, J L H o I C^IH and 
recognizing that the mattei cum Id not be fettled without a 
dei i n .ion hy t I'M-1 Hi 'f1 M,at€F hnprenie Crm* j
 t thfj State 
Superintendent sought i HI utmat IL n 1.1 mi unini i in* J r*-j I ni I1'J cases 
which might reach the court within a short time, rendering the 
Utah I i 1 i gallon wu.'l , ',',',''ho Rhode Island case appeared to be the 
best vehicle for that purpose i 1'nen represern n lives I rhe 
Providence, Rhode Island School Committee were asked about their 
plans : • ire - . * . . - . ^ rie- t - j - * 3i r 
d i s t i . c n was" ^:L., = n . t.ha - A . t - r ^ . ^ >. . y 
a * A f t e r : , « - ;?5 r r w.-T' * he p a r t i e * ' r ' * . .-:•-. "~Ur> 
A t t o i .e^ ue:.- , . * • * . - c * s l a t u r * - * h -
S t a t e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t : t f e r e d * P r o v i d e . . ,-, :. -
i ( i ' i 'f dh t r a s s i s t in s e e k i n g a r e v i e w oi t h e c a s e b e f o r e 
t h e fabpreriit » nir+ , 'I " i I o id* n.f d "L • h i n *T i <* i d v i r e l t h a t 
Utah took rn p o s i t i o n on t h e m e r i t s , would not p a i t i e i p a u in 
s u | 4 i ) 1 i n i in A t t a c k i n g t h e p r a c t i c e of g r a d u a t i o n p r a y e r i t s e l f ; 
would n;d. make any add J I. I »MI.I i p ' yn^m' 1 »"i n making the o f f e r 
fo r t h e s o l e p u r p o s e of o b t a i n i n g a r e s o j u t i o n of t h e jibsmc m 
thriii ' t . t ha t tin- ill i-tli i s s u e r would b-p a d e q u a t e l y a d d r e s s e d , 
payment wat dlsi . u o n d i t J oned u fn i trai ' i in ' i * l i t j appea l in t o n u s of 
t h e F e d e r a l fn s t r i c t Court s i n i u n c t i o n which g e n e r a l l y 
proh i l i t tni ijiii s uidvei rii l ii ra Junt ion c e r e m o n i e s . The P r o v i d e n c e 
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School Committee agreed with those conditions and authorized 
proceeding with a Petition for Certiorari, and the State 
Superintendent thereupon authorized payment of the funds. As 
hoped, on March 18, 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
U.S. , 113 L.Ed.2d 240 (U.S. 1991) (No. 90-1014), and 
graduation prayer-related litigation in Utah essentially stopped 
pending issuance of a decision in the Rhode Island case by the 
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court recently decided 
the graduation prayer case, Lee v. Weisman, U.S. , 6 0 
U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992) Supreme Court No. 90-1014 (decision 
below: Weisman v. Leef 728 F.Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990), aff'd 908 
F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990) ) . 
The State Superintendent also requested the Utah 
Attorney General to file a brief as Amicus Curiae at the petition 
stage, which was done.2 The purpose of both the brief and 
financial assistance was never to promote or prevent prayer, or 
to take sides on the issue. The sole purpose was to encourage 
the United States Supreme Court to grant certiorari, take the 
case, decide the issue and put the matter to rest. No further 
brief or expenditure were ever contemplated by the State 
Superintendent. In its statement of facts the Society says: "At 
2The Society of Separationists and other Plaintiffs also filed 
suit against the Utah Attorney General R. Paul Van Dam claiming 
violation of Utah Constitution article I, § 4. District Court No. 
910902847CV. That case was dismissed in the trial court and again 
dismissed on Appeal. See Supreme Court No. 91-0384. 
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t h e S u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' b infcujin i a i Itn \\ In imi wris t»^ use t h e i r 
funds t o seek a r e v e i s a J of the f e d e r a l F i i s t L i r iu i i i JIU I I I 
A||.e£ji . i I I I / I I M.iif p u b l i c p r a y e i ai P r o v i d e n c e J u n i o r High 
School g r a d u a t i o n ceremoii i tj • \ i< imtnui ' i heriei 1 E s t a b l i s h m e n t 
Q x a u s e # ' ( A p p e l l a n t s ' Br ief ai \ ) 
'li.n Loie«j 'i*n s t a t e m e n t is o i f e r e d by m e S o c i e t y a£ a 
s t a t e m e n t ci f d r t » 1 ul »1
 A> ii i. t i e d a*.11 n,., i- J i \i J, i, " The 
S o c i e t y offers- nc r e f e r e n c e tc t he o f f i c i a l r e c o r d ui any lit*" 
SOLI u A M u i i I1, i if-f <«iri«1,-jrn Taqaar t gave no such i n s t r u c t i o n and 
t h e S o c i e t y ' s r u s - s t a t e m e n t hat UL I j t , i I»,. " , ' > u1 • 
Because cf th- ' S o c i e t y ' s f a i l u r e t , pursur t h i ' i s s u e n . t h e 
D i s t r i c i I'tiiuii! ilit it in - 111 i i I:-M n ml , no f i n d i n g s of f a c t or 
d e c i s i o n fo r trie Supreme Court to r ev i ew 
The' p u r p o s e and e f f e c t ol t h e payment t o t h~ p h ^ ^ e 
I s l anc i s c h c j i oL s I i M, I *ci. I i m • - i r 1 i ri r h t a I n i nq a * - i t <- f 
C e r t i o r a r i from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supremt LOUJ I M inn I M • 
. i i . L i l ft"1,.1*1 r f Appeal? Uni ted S t a t e s Supreme Cour t r u i e s 
r e q u i r e t h a t an Jlit .t i u. kU i.n I i H ' iini * jdenl t fy t h e p a r t y 
s u p p o r t e d , Sui . ("1 h "i 7 *' There in hu d±t»siriaL i \. e i i vi \ \ 
fn! l t hi,il s b r i e f in tin f was f i l e d m t hr p e t i t i o n s t a g e in 
sup p o i t o i 1.1 e p e t i t i on i i i i f e u rtn , bin ri i o n, ^1 
s u g g e s t a f f i r m a n c e oi r e v e r s a l , The S o c i e t y ' * chard1 . Lei i -.dl. ir, n 
I M ex[:* ^ of money nr t i l i n g ot a b r i e f a s an e f f o r t to 
s e e k r e v e r s a l i i i s u p p o r t oi pjnytM i SJIUJIJ^ ' iimij and w i t h o u t 
any b a s i s i n f a c t . 
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Also, in its statement of facts the Society claims that 
"[TJhe Superintendent publicly announced that [he], too, would 
file an amicus brief on the merits in the Rhode Island prayer 
case. Complaint at 1 9.M (Appellants' Brief at 8.) 
The Society's statement is wrong and misleading. 
Defendant Taggart had never supported filing a brief on the 
merits for or against prayer at graduation and has never made 
such announcement publicly or privately. The Society's statement 
has no basis in fact, and to cite the Society's own allegations 
as the factual source is meaningless. 
The allegations that Defendant Taggart took a position 
encouraging graduation prayer or made any expenditure "to advance 
a pro-prayer stance before the United States Supreme Court" are 
simply unfounded. (See Appellants' Brief at 8.) 
Defendant Taggart agrees that the injunctive relief 
asked by the Society is now moot and irrelevant, the matter of 
prayer at school graduation ceremonies having been fully decided 
by the United States Supreme Court.3 (See Appellants' Brief at 
8, 9.) 
3Utah's efforts in providing financial assistance and filing 
a brief Amicus Curiae at the petition stage were successful in 
helping to get a decision on the issue of graduation prayer. In 
June 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that prayer at official 
public school graduation ceremonies is unconstitutional. See Lee 
v. Weisman, 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Dismissal by the lower court should be affirmed: 
1. Because I In* Unite :1 S M tes> Supreme Court 
granted the Providence Rhock- Is land 
Petition for Certiorari this matter 
moot . IhfeM e i ?•, n lli J no I e> f I 1; o en ioin 
and there is no factual bat. is oi luwej 
court decision on the merits from which 
to appeal. 
2. None ol the Plaint if f/Appe.l lants have 
p i- < t hf requ i rement p t or s 1 andir y , They 
have nc * dlIeg<jJ i il.,i, " r* '"nr^e 
impart direct vi otherwise. 
3. A; p- I I-*T t c» -lt ty cannot pievaii ^ii the 
merits, 
a. The court should not Jecido the 
meiit1 n' lliir i art v lie re there was 
rn; tact ua 1 Lasit , Luu; i h - i 
decision on I lie merits of the 
ri^iul i'1.11 ".onal issue in the court 
be Iok . 
b. It the c. ai t reaches the m o o t s , 
1 ln: f 1 1 it fi i) i i i I-JI c « i r tifirit P 1 11 a 
school d i s i n c L ficia t lie pi rpose, 
condition and effect cf resolving a 
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legal issue for the public schools. 
Defendant Taggart did not promote 
or oppose graduation prayer and the 
effect cf financial aid did not 
violate the Utah Constitution 
article I, section 4. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISMISSAL, BY THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
POINT I. 
THIS MATTER IS MOOT 
The constitutionality of public school graduation 
prayer has been settled. The United States Supreme Court clearly 
resolved that issue in Lee v. Weisman, U.S. , 60 
U.S.L.W. 4723 (June 24, 1992). The instant case was moot when 
the Writ of Certiorari was granted on March 18, 1991, U. S. 
, 113 L.Ed.2d 240. No further explanation or clarification 
was needed or sought by the State Superintendent. Since the 
amicus brief at the petition stage in Lee, the State 
Superintendent has not requested any further brief nor is any 
further expenditure of such funds contemplated. The Society has 
petitioned for an injunction to prevent any expenditures 
concerning the resolution of the graduation prayer issue. It was 
this original petition which was dismissed by the trial court. 
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S i n c e t n p r e q u e s t e d j u d i c i a l r e l i e f on a p p e a l c a n n o t a i l e d t h e 
r i g h t I " ' i t J q."jn i l t l.r ii.nt t e r .1 s nor < Duran v> M o r r - s , 
635 P ?d 4* «1" illtdi* i "r^  1 1 "Hiuit- i s m I MI J 11 I I t h i s 
r " lift t o en j r i ,r< 
Iht I 1 i J 1 in ui 11 a 1 r MM 1 ly 11 ] 1 OWP i t h e d i c t a t e s of th<-
Utah Supreme c o u r t when he maiiiJiiLed trial 1 1. t 1 «" 1 muni?-* h- b 
1)HI miif- m'irit m u t t shou ld e n t e r an o rd t 1 ol d i s m i s s a l 
K e r h i s h v . ti.K, r . r . k Ao, t , » 14' ! I'd "Mp ^ ( Utdl. 19 82 j 
The t r i a l c o u r t ; : 1 - : ly d i s m i s s e d that" Ccu-'f at- nm t . 
Trie Uua.i ,. : reipe Cour t na t made 11 c j e a r t h a t i t wi J 
a v o i d comment wb^n - 1. iiiot 1 11 -1M • 1 «- i-u l a "• "hiF 'Th i s Court 
was n o t i n t e n d e d 1 :> , no r I t i t endowed wi t ) 1 ai i t l rori t> t o 
ifijJi.M a h is-'i i 1 o p i n i o n s , and has sa id so many t i m e s ' S t a t e v.., 
S t r o m q u i s t * 6 iy l , / > ' l, ' . .." I " MLI ru sh , 64» I 2d a t 
*"H? The S o c i e t y 1 ^ e x p r e s s l y a s k i n g to i an a d v i s o r y oyn n 11. 
I,f >• d ' L j i j n w i 1
 :i J :<! J j - i i t r rn r - n < tc ni, t ^ ' s p e - u l a t J MJI i i j £ J t t h e r e 
i s a ' r ange of p o s s i b l e v i o l a t i o n . - I Mi l< sf- 4 i or -i bv 
Titaf o f i i c i a i ^ ( A p p e l l a n t s ' B i i e i a i r * j ( emphas i s a i»J< JJ 
i'lit i- >i et ) 1'nrM'i v^ci ap" r) sor.e h y p o t h e t i c a l f u t u r e a c t i o n 
nt t h e s t a t e The i e it» 111 l I L« I I in i p u;t I i f I iu S c e i f t v ' j 
c a s e D e s p i t e t h e p o l a r i z e d p o s i t i o n s and t h e numbei 02 1 as*.4 
inv , . . * ~ e v WF:sman , f u r t h e r 
a c t i o n - ; : < ~: 1- \ p r a y e r by : . - - ni i s v e r y 
u i i i i K t \ " . - . - r e n d e r s » f r e . y t.u -1: . ; - - \ - . e c u i d t i ve 
p r o s p e :5 .- e s s a u L t i i u c . 
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The Society supports its argument against mootness by 
the fact that the United States Supreme Court opinion in Lee v. 
Weisman was a narrow 5-4 decision and that a change in the Court 
may change the outcome, (Appellants' Brief at 23, 24.) The 
Society is thus seeking some kind of ''insurance decision" from 
the Utah Supreme Court in case of some future improbability. 
Does the Society also wish reassurance from state tribunals for 
other 5-4 decisions from the nation's highest court? What does 
the margin of victory have to be in order for the Society to feel 
secure? Again, such speculation contradicts the practice against 
advisory opinions. Injunctions are not provided to insure 
against feared, but unfounded, risk. Backman v. Salt Lake 
County, 375 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1962). The strong judicial 
policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that courts 
refrain from adjudicating moot questions. Merhish, 646 P.2d at 
732. 
These types of unnecessary decisions have been 
previously declined because they did not decide a specific case. 
Hovle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1980)(Court held that 
the constitutionality of a statute requiring payment of a filing 
fee to become a candidate for office was nonjusticiable). The 
fact that it is theoretically possible that the state may make 
unconstitutional expenditures some time in the future is 
irrelevant. If such an eventuality ever does occur, it is to be 
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clt'ii it v. i •" h m l ' if mil when .it arises, and then it must be up: L 
petition oi tin- iii |uied part>. Id. 
The Society also claims t" :' , ' r;es,r d~>e? ^ ^ appl^ 
111- i e I IM ridSr ' H I , i"»-if. n j s ei ur" tr p'*** constitution a* i 
separation of powei s concept . nAppr._ 
Somehow it argues this fact raise: > - rsue nrc/- - : :; . 
requ.inf i i 1 ,t,n I
 4 ' I dl j I i f "'M'/^sn ,: decision? -• -• * * fe 
avoided whether they m v o J v e tLfr . ,^  .:. . . „ - . , 
tU*-' l' ?d at 2 4? A const i tutiona J questic r d e? - ise 
mere!} becauM ' f c , st-M n i i . ±& suujui mticw.." 
id.. 
The Society ' :rther contends that any judicial 
Intervention 'was It us! ; in L rji utj* J MI M M hfipiM at w m c h the 
publi •'. - xpencl i t ure occurred i AppeJ itwitt Bi J L I at - J , i I.I i in 
Light cii t hf> facts of r.his cas* , this allegation is confusing. 
The State Superintendent, pioviCnd pun,! ,i ' uni J < v of r Inn intention 
to spend the funds well in advance of LCU, actual expenditure. 
Specif ica.l Jy, I ho Society's connseJ in this appeal was notified 
of Defendant Tagyai t '" fa actjun be tore I In- money * ins spent , 
Nevertheless, the Society chose- too- wait some riiuiiths until May I , 
I, "99I Mi f i I ir in ip, ."omplaint and petition for injunctive relief. 
This Court has recognized certd in to:! rr.iordi.nary 
exeinptions to> mootness in Wickhani v. Fisher, 6 2 9 P . 2d 6&6 , tiy"!..;' 
(I II. rili lyui), Ili.iWPvei t" l"i i n matter does not fall under any of the 
exceptions t o the mootness pr incipie , Ac exception in i «'.jl"i l. dppd y 
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if the instant case "is of wide concern, affects the public 
interest, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and, because of 
the brief time any one person is affected, would otherwise likely 
escape judicial review." JEd. (emphasis added). Each of these 
aspects must be present for this exception to apply. The instant 
case does not satisfy all of these requirements. 
Specifically, this case is not likely to recur in a 
similar manner. The United States Supreme Court has further 
defined this "capable of repetition" exception to the mootness 
doctrine. "[T]here must be a 'reasonable expectation' or a 
'demonstrated probability' that the same controversy will recur 
involving the same complaining party.,,A Murphy v. Hunt, 455 
U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (emphasis added). Neither Defendant Taggart 
nor the State Board of Education are parties to other litigation 
concerning prayer and both intend to follow Lee v. Weisman. 
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that 
graduation prayer is unconstitutional. The issue is resolved and 
there is no reason for the state to pursue an answer that has 
already been clearly provided. The Superintendent will not spend 
any more funds to seek a resolution to this divisive matter. The 
Society cannot contest expenditures which will not occur. There 
A
 The Supreme Court further delineated this requirement by 
stating that "[it] never held that a mere physical or theoretical 
possibility was sufficient to satisfy [this] test . . . If this 
were true, virtually any matter of short duration would be 
reviewable." Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982). 
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is no reasonable expectation or demons! r •* l i HI pinbabilily ll I 
this same controversy will recur with this same party. 
O, in sequent J y , t lio oapabl o of irepeti tl on " factor i s not involved 
and the judicially created exception to PT jtnebh isn inappl iCal.'K'/ . 
This case was moot at the tria 1 court and remains moot toda)• 
'"["tie lower cou,i" I, ' F. C! i.biru ss a 1 btnoii Id hf upheld. 
POIIsH ;• . 
THE SOCIETY"' OF SKPAKA--ONISTS AND 
INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS LACK STANDING 
A pd i t } st b4 iinji ii dt i liUihtoi'i pinliTOf MI t must have 
s t a n d i n g t o i nvoke j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e Court , J e n k i n s v . bwdn, 
i. i'» l ' .?ii 114'J » l i 4 u (liiiMli 1963) . "Anyone b r i n q i n g an o r i g i n a l 
p r o c e e d m g - - a d i s p u t e lln-il r 1 in j p rvse i„ + e1 "' f ht v:ui*tr- fo r 
t h e f i r s t t ime—mus t s a t i s f y thv t r a d i t i o n a i s t a n d i n g t e s t . 
S o c i e t y i l Pi 1. J o u r n a l i s t s - v . B u l l o c k , /4 3 P 2d 1166, l l n U 
(Utah 198"' ,i The Utah Supreme Court hay M - l c i i e d in IIII'HH 
g e n e r a l s t a n d a r d s when d e t e n u n ing s t a n d i rig. " i 'erracor v . Utah 
Mil • c t S t a t e Landi , "' l » i0 ?d 7 Q h , 799 (1Jt ah I 9 H8 ) ( c i t i n g J e n k i n s , 
6 75 F . 2d a t M i d i TII»J Soc l e i y ' J-. i i iLeje, lo d I I m t 
t h e s e c r i t e r i a and t h e r e f o r e Lhey c a n n o t be a l l o w e d t o p u r s u e 
t In is- mif] 1: f n r . 
The f i r s t c r i t e r i o n i : t l u l <jpj o 1J aj« I I'MII-I 1-*- d! 1« 1 
show t h a t he has s u f f e r e d some d i s t i n c t and p a l p a b l e i n i u i y ihan 
hi fii .j | HiT-oTiu .1 M ' I J L 1 Mit* ui rome of t h e l e g a l d i s p u t e . ' 
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Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. A mere allegation of an adverse 
impact is not enough. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
The Society has made no such showing. The tax exempt 
Society is not a taxpayer and none of the Plaintiffs articulated 
any required personal stake in this legal dispute. The Society 
relies on the fact that some of its members are members of the 
general tax paying citizenry of the state. This Court 
specifically held that such status alone is insufficient. A mere 
reliance on a general status as a taxpayer and citizen does 
nothing to distinguish a plaintiff from any member of the public 
at large. JId. at 1151. The Society is simply asserting a 
general grievance which over a million other Utahns could assert. 
The Society further claims that it is comprised of parents 
concerned with the education of Utah's youth. (Appellants' Brief 
at 15.) Any distinct and palpable injury is lacking. No 
students or parents are listed and no individual harm is even 
asserted. Such general allegations simply amount to a kind of 
"spiritual discomfort," falling short of a specific and distinct 
injury to them. Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1151. 
"Second, if a plaintiff does not have standing under 
the first criterion, he may have standing if no one else has a 
greater interest in the outcome of the case and the issues are 
unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has 
standing to raise the issue." Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799. In the 
Society's attempt to elevate this issue to constitutional 
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proportions, they have stated that " | u ] n 1 e! t ih Society j i 
granted a heailng, parameters concerning t fie em ouragement nf 
)'i: I j iji j Mj'> Hxen K M 11 | mill n i nflii , H 1 t -,wnjr. 1< uphc> 111 the Utah 
Constitution will remain nude J meateJ , 'ij4 t IJ diitfc Hi o ' * ' 
ii in inn essence, thn Society argues that if they are nut granted 
standi mi, IIHI lliej V I I I iiuyim* I'hi' IIH njianfed standing, and t**w 
state's establishment clause will go uninterpreted. 
In fact , there are twi other cases currently pending in 
which the Sin. n«ly ma .' IIICM I un^iti-M intent I 1 hnn it has lienj 
Society of Separationists v. Whitehead, Hardrnan, hh- . ^2••.. * ' ," 
fi ] ed Kay " „ I <<, \ i discussing the constitutionality of prayer at. 
ci ty council meetimjy) , Suclet y o1 Sepaia11orusts v. AJ p111e 
School District, (4th Dist, CI, No, 910400647) (questioning the 
const it ut iona 1 ity of prayer at. school graduation undei the Utah 
Constitution ) , Tho Society cannot U-; ind\,on:e uJ thto<e ", ai:-es t < > 
whic("i i t is a party , 1 n t.hese cases, the consLitutiona 1 I ssue ot 
publit t unds being spent :in f UT t herancc-1 of religion is raised by 
parties that may have aetiirj.l standing 'I'lu... So»' iet,y oinnioi! »""•" ' y 
upon the "no greater* interest" exception or the uniqueness of the 
.insiaifit casp u i fnonle i raditional standinq requirements. 
" Third , e ve ri though stand J n«i | j t ncJ 1. 1 ound t»> f" .v i s I 
under the first two cri t e r i a , d plaintift may nonetheless have 
standj.ng i i n in if-suo arc unique and ot such great public 
importance thai they ought to be decided in 1 u i; Lhiej duct J! t I "' 
public interest.1 Terracor, ? '" '" rj, 2' d a t / 9 9 , T h e issue r a I s e d , 
-iy-
"in and of itself," has to be of sufficient public import. 
Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1150. 
The issue of prayer at public school graduation is of 
great public importance. However, the issue of whether the 
Superintendent can expend a relatively small amount of funds in 
order to encourage a resolution of a legal question, in and of 
itself, is not of great public importance. The Society is 
attempting to closely link the two issues to somehow create an 
issue of constitutional proportions. This attempt fails since 
the issue of public school prayer has been decided, and the 
expenditure itself was only one step toward that judicial 
resolution. The expenditure, alone, is not of sufficient public 
importance that it needs to be analyzed by this Court.5 
Even if this Court were to see this issue as one of 
great public importance, the Society of Separationists should not 
automatically be granted standing. "[DJespite our recognition of 
this Court's power to 'grant standing where matters of great 
public interest and societal impact are concerned,' this Court 
5
 In addition, the Society readily admits that the state 
may spend public funds to defend against the Society's allegations 
in this case. (Appellants' Brief at 39 n. 16.) Under the 
Society's rationale, if the Superintendent had been an actual party 
to the Lee v. Weisman case, the expenditure would have been 
constitutional, even if the state had taken a position on the 
merits. It is difficult to understand how the Society finds that 
type of expenditure acceptable but still contests an expenditure 
that did not support either side on the merits. 
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v i l l v it redd illy r e l i e v e a p l a i n t i f f of t h e s a l u t a r y r e q u i r e m e n t 
ot showing a r m I iind p e r s o n a I imlr i t -h! in I In J I D I J U I I , "' imd* 
The S o c i e t y r e l i e s on J e n k i n s a s t h e b a s i s t o r c l a i m i n g 
mi e^! i | ii J f'hi linn I h< qeni'icil i. uln in I v t a n d i n q . ( A p p e l l a n t s ' B r i e f 
page lh I Bull t lie e x c e p t i o n i t i n a p p l i c a b l e hi A) ifie I 1 din I: 
S o c i e t y , In J e n k i n s t h e Supreme Cour t r e q u i r e d p l a i n t i f f J e n k i n s 
h ill IHIIM a l l e g e M " i l i n r i riiivprsp i m p a r t ' r n s o e p t i b l e ol 
p r o o f , J e n k i n s , fi T "i 1" hi
 L\ t 1 1 i \ , wh i r n w MJ I u I i KH I y he i e I i e * t- i 
if t h e government a c t i o n were d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . In t he 
in1 LiiMii iiibi j i iii Sinn ii i y Mini i IIM ii i a i nf i f f s m e r e l y a l i e q e t h a t 
t h e y a i e c i t i z e n ? and tax p a y e r s l e a v i n g tiny a d v e r s e impai f u| • 
e o n ] e r t u r e 'l"he S o c i e t y ' s eomp1 a i n t i s t o t a l l y d e v o i d of any 
d 1 11 jd L i '. hi J (Kl'.eine MII| «n 1 „ I i I i t IIPI'W . c e Thf r niif." 1 a i n t 
V r ~v i \i £:: ::? b a s i s fvr s t a n d i n g , and d i s m i s s a l t oi l a c k t. £ 
sidridiiiLj i s WXSJLJ, Ldiveri • 
POINT 1T1 
APPELLANT SOCIETY CANNOT PREVAIL 
ON THE MERITS OF THIS APPEAL 
a Dismissal ii i the i*ower Court. Should Be Affirmed 
Because Appellant Society Did Not Support Its 
Allegations With a Hearing, Record or Other 
Factual Basis. 
This case has gone hoiv >ani \ ei Lli ,i I: a, h e a r n i g n,i iiny 
effort on th€j Society's part to create d factual record or 
arrural* f i nHl i rn;] L in -appeal the Society contrives its own 
inadequate set ot facts from which jt dshi ihi'i cuuil t ilid1/ 
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inferences serving only the Society's objectives. The Society 
asks this court to be the finder of fact and merely assume that 
the Society's statement of facts is correct. In effect the 
Society asks this court to go beyond its appellate jurisdiction 
to function at once as both a trial court and appellate court and 
render an original decision. This court has repeatedly declined 
to act as the fact finder and should either dismiss this case or 
remand it to the lower court to develop an appropriate record. 
In Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers - Irons 
Recreation Land and Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), the Utah Appellate Court said: "Rule 11 of our appellate 
rules 'directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence 
relevant to the issues raised on appeal.' (Citations omitted) 
In the absence of a complete record, we must presume that the 
trial court's finding is 'supported by competent and sufficient 
evidence.'" jrd. at 252 
In the instant case, the factual record is not only 
incomplete; it is non-existent. The Society as appellant has the 
duty to support its appeal with an adequate and proper record: 
Appellant has the burden when raising 
objections on appeal to see that the record 
contains the materials necessary to support 
his appeal. We cannot speculate on the 
existence of facts that do not appear in the 
record. When crucial matters are not 
included in the record, the missing portions 
are presumed to support the action of the 
trial court. (Citations omitted) 
State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985). 
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Where there is no record, the Supreme Court cannot 
manufacture the facts and must treat Appellant Society's 
statement as unfounded allegations: 
It is not our province to measure conflicting 
evidence, credibility of witnesses, nor the 
weight to be given the one or the other• 
That responsibility belongs strictly to the 
trier of fact. 
• • • • 
Absent that record Appellants' assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation which 
the review court has no power to determine. 
This Court simply cannot rule on a question 
which depends for its existence upon alleged 
facts unsupported by the record. (Citations 
omitted) 
State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 292, 293 (Utah 1982). 
Appellant Society had the opportunity and the duty to 
see that an appropriate factual record was made in the lower 
court but failed to do so. In the absence of any factual support 
for the Society's claims on appeal, this court should presume 
that the lower court's decision is correct and so affirm. 
b. Defendant Taggart's Expenditure in Support of 
the Providence Rhode Island School District's 
Petition for Certiorari Did Not Violate the 
Utah Constitution. 
The main issue in the Society's brief on appeal is 
whether Defendant Taggart's expenditure of financial assistance 
violates the Utah Constitution. There was never any decision on 
the merits in the court below. If the trial court erred, it was 
not because of a decision on the constitutional issue, and the 
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case should either be dismissed or remanded for a considered 
decision in the trial court. Nevertheless, this court has before 
it the Society's brief addressing this issue on the merits and 
Defendant Taggart is compelled to respond on the merits. 
Defendant Taggart transferred a sum of money to the 
Providence Rhode Island public school district to assist in that 
district's petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court asking the high court to take the Lee v. Weisman 
case and render a definitive decision on the issue of public 
school graduation prayer. Utah also filed a brief at the 
petition stage in support of the school district's petition to 
assist in getting the issue before the high court for resolution. 
In conjunction with several other states and organizations the 
effort was successful; the high court granted the petition, took 
the case and decided the issue. The State Superintendent has a 
duty to provide guidance to the public schools Utah Code Ann. § 
53A-1-301, 303 (1992). His support of the Petition for 
Certiorari was consistent with that duty and was a reasonable 
effort to bring order to a chaotic situation. 
Defendant Taggart does not contest the allegation of an 
expenditure of financial assistance to the Providence Rhode 
Island school district. But the purpose, conditions and effect 
of the decision to assist are factual matters at issue and are 
crucial to the proper resolution of this case. Without those 
facts the Society's claim is a mere allegation. The Society 
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could have had a hearing on these issues but failed through its 
own neglect to create an appropriate basis for its allegations. 
Now on appeal the Society simply asks this court to assume the 
Society's stated version of the facts and reach the Society's 
conclusion with no factual basis. 
On the merits, the Society claims that financially 
assisting the Rhode Island school district and filing a brief at 
the petition stage contravenes the Utah constitutional provision 
against union of Church and State: 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no 
religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any office of public trust 
or for any vote at any election; nor shall 
any person be incompetent as a witness or 
juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of 
Church and State, nor shall any church 
dominate the State or interfere with its 
functions. No public money or property shall 
be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, 
or for the support of any ecclesiastical 
establishment. No property qualification 
shall be required of any person to vote, or 
hold office, except as provided in this 
Constitution. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 4 (emphasis supplied). 
In support of its claim the Society argues that 
Defendant Taggart expended state money in a deliberate effort to 
sustain prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. But the 
claim is totally unfounded and has no basis in fact. 
-25-
For instance, the Society argues that Defendant 
Taggart: 
[A]ided the litigation, the sole purpose of 
which is to legalize prayer at public school 
graduation ceremonies. The Superintendent 
has intentionally chosen an issue and he has 
voluntarily decided to support one side of 
the issue. . . . his support of the Rhode 
Island case constitutes a deliberate choice 
to finance the pro-prayer stance advocated by 
the Providence school district. 
Rather than reflecting a neutral stance the 
Superintendent's choice to fund one side of 
the Rhode Island prayer case advanced solely 
the cause of prayer in public schools. . . . 
In fact a decision by the United States 
Supreme Court to deny certiorari would have 
achieved this goal [of ending litigation in 
Utah's courts]. 
(Appellant Society's Brief at 42, 43) (emphasis added). 
Such statements regarding Defendant Taggart's intent 
and purpose are indeed bold but misleading since the Society 
failed to take any action to elicit true and correct factual 
information. The Society asks this court to leap to the 
conclusion that supporting a petition for certiorari 
axiomatically must support prayer at graduation. 
The Society is correct that a brief at the petition 
stage against a writ of certiorari and a resulting denial of the 
writ would approve the first circuit ruling against prayer; it is 
erroneous for the Society to assume that a First Federal Circuit 
decision is binding on Utah state or federal courts within the 
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Tenth Federal Circuit. Had the writ been denied the Utah cases 
would have continued at great expense and detriment of the public 
schools. 
During 1990 and 1991, the constitutionality of prayer 
at public school graduation ceremonies was anything but clear. 
Both federal and state courts in Utah were asked to determine 
whether such prayer was constitutional under both federal and 
state constitutions. For example, in Albright v. Board of 
Education of Granite School District, 765 F.Supp. 682 (D. Utah 
1991) Hon. J. Thomas Green, federal district judge, denied a 
preliminary injunction to prohibit public school graduation 
prayer because he found that neither federal nor state 
constitutional provisions prohibited graduation prayer. 
Prior Utah cases which have considered article I, 
section 4 are consistent in finding that only governmental action 
directly supporting an ecclesiastical establishment has been 
found unconstitutional. 
In Manning v. Sevier County, 30 Utah 2d 305, 517 P.2d 
549 (Utah 1973) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a situation whereby 
Sevier County would construct a hospital and lease it to a 
church-owned health service for the purpose of providing public 
health care. The court found that an outright gift of the 
hospital to the church at the end of the lease would be 
unconstitutional. 
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In Thomas v. Daughters of the Utah Pioneers, 114 Utah 
108, 197 P.2d 477 (Utah 1948) appeal dismissed 336 U.S. 930 
(1949) the Utah State legislature appropriated $150,000 for the 
purpose of building a Pioneer Memorial Building for the Daughters 
of the Utah Pioneers (D.U.P.). Plaintiffs claimed that the 
object of the D.U.P,. organization was religious and that the 
appropriation furthered the objective of the D.U.P. in violation 
of the Utah Constitution article I, section 4. The Supreme Court 
allowed that the predominant faith might receive the greater 
benefit of the pioneer exhibits in the building. Id., at 489. 
But the definitive purpose of the D.U.P. was education about 
belief about religious freedom rather than perpetuation of the 
predominant faith, JEd. at 490, and therefore article I, section 4 
was not violated. 
In Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 
Utah 188, 192 P.2d 580 (Utah 1948), Plaintiffs claimed that 
granting teachers credit toward retirement for service in 
parochial schools violated Utah Constitution article I, section 
4. The Supreme Court found that the purpose of granting credit 
for such service would promote retention of experienced teachers 
as a benefit to the public school system and thus was not an 
appropriation applied to religious worship, exercise or 
instruction. The "motive . . . was to build a better state 
school system." Id., at 588. 
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In Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 
631 (1960) cert, denied 365 U.S. 860 (1961) Plaintiffs challenged 
a sale by Salt Lake City to the Salt Lake Chamber of Commerce and 
Zions Securities Corporation (LDS Church) and then to the federal 
government for a federal office building. The lower court 
dismissed the action. On appeal, regarding Utah's Constitution 
article I, section 4, the Utah Supreme Court said: "To expect a 
court to infer from the sole fact that the parties involved are 
the Church and the federal government that there must be some 
improper influence exerted on the latter would involve farfetched 
and unrealistic conjecture." Id. at 635. 
In the instant case, to expect a court to infer from 
the sole fact that Defendant Taggart financially assisted a 
public school district to petition the United States Supreme 
Court to resolve a legal issue involving prayer that Defendant 
Taggart somehow promoted prayer would involve farfetched and 
unrealistic conjecture. 
The foregoing Utah cases dealing with Utah Constitution 
article I, section 4 illustrate two basic points: First, the 
motive or purpose of an official action is an important if not 
paramount consideration in deciding whether the constitutional 
provision is violated; Second, even if an official action has 
some incidental benefit to a particular ecclesiastical 
establishment or to religion in general, the primary and direct 
effect is controlling. From the Utah cases even Appellant 
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Society has distilled the correct principle: "The challenged 
schemes did little or nothing to advance religious institutions 
involved. Importantly, the primary purpose of each scheme was 
secular and outweighed any insubstantial gains realized by the 
religious or quasi-religious organizations." (Appellants' Brief 
at 32.) That same principle applies in the instant case: the 
primary purpose of Defendant Taggart's financial aid was to 
resolve litigation; possible gain, if any, to a religious 
organization, exercise or worship was incidental., 
When reviewed in light of Utah precedent Defendant 
Taggart's action to financially assist the Rhode Island district 
is constitutional. First, the motive or purpose was to obtain a 
definitive answer to an issue which vexed the entire Utah public 
school system and perplexed courts across the United States. At 
the time the only manner of encouraging a definite resolution was 
to encourage the Rhode Island school district to initiate the 
certiorari process by a brief at the petition stage. Contrary to 
the Society's unfounded representations, the purpose was not to 
support or promote prayer at graduation ceremonies but merely to 
get the case before the court. Second, the effect of the 
financial assistance was to obtain a solid answer to the problem. 
Denial of the petition would have resulted in a final answer only 
for the First Circuit. Once the initial petition was granted, 
Defendant Taggart's purpose was accomplished. Regardless of the 
decision in Lee v. Weisman, the decision would be definitive for 
-30-
Utah and afford relief for Utah from a continual drain of 
education funds to defend prayer cases• 
The Society does not articulate just how financial 
assistance was specifically applied to religious worship, 
exercise or instruction; it asks the court to assume a conclusion 
without foundation or basis in fact. There has been no benefit 
to prayer or religion from Defendant Taggart's action. If by 
some stretch of the imagination some benefit can be perceived, it 
is minimal. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary concern of Appellant Society is whether the 
Utah Constitution is violated. The Society's action, untimely 
prosecuted and without factual basis, should be dismissed because 
Plaintiffs/Appellants have no standing, their allegations are 
moot and they cannot prevail on the merits of its constitutional 
argument. In effect Appellant Society is asking for an advisory 
opinion. The lower court dismissal should be affirmed. In the 
alternative, the case should be at least remanded to the lower 
court for development of an appropriate factual record. 
Dated this 'V^ day of August, 1992. 
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